The last Stop on the Orient Express : The Balkans and the Politics of British In(ter)vention by Goldsworthy, Vesna
 Balkanologie
Revue d'études pluridisciplinaires 
Vol. III, n°2 | 1999
Volume III Numéro 2
The last Stop on the Orient Express : The Balkans
and the Politics of British In(ter)vention
Vesna Goldsworthy
Édition électronique
URL : http://journals.openedition.org/balkanologie/749
ISSN : 1965-0582
Éditeur
Association française d'études sur les Balkans (Afebalk)
Édition imprimée
Date de publication : 1 décembre 1999
ISSN : 1279-7952
 
Référence électronique
Vesna Goldsworthy, « The last Stop on the Orient Express : The Balkans and the Politics of British In
(ter)vention », Balkanologie [En ligne], Vol. III, n°2 | décembre 1999, mis en ligne le 22 juin 2010,
consulté le 07 mai 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/balkanologie/749 
Ce document a été généré automatiquement le 7 mai 2019.
© Tous droits réservés
The last Stop on the Orient Express : The
Balkans and the Politics of British In
(ter)vention
Vesna Goldsworthy
1 Although this examination of possible definitions of the Balkans concentrates initially on
the  human rights  discourse  which  accompanied  Western  involvement  in  the  former
Yugoslavia  over  the  past  decade  – especially  as  it  preceded  and underpinned NATO
military  action  over  Kosovo  – its  aim  is  not  to  dissect  the  rights  and  wrongs  of
intervention. Rather, I focus on the way in which the rhetorical strategies used to justify
it reflect on the debate about definitions of South-Eastern Europe. Of particular interest
in this context is the stance adopted by the British Labour Government, whereby the
intervention in the Balkans was described not as a one-off, but as a starting point for a
new kind of  world-wide  humanitarianism.  The  media’s  emphasis  on a  new “ethical”
foreign  policy  was  undiminished  until  the  end  of  1999,  when  the  renewed  Russian
military action in Chechenya presented a situation in which the use of Western force,
whatever the human rights position, was clearly not considered an option. Humanitarian
interventionism or – as Noam Chomsky defined it – “new military humanism”1, practised
in the Balkans in the aftermath of the Cold War, proved to be of limited value in relation
to Moscow. 
 
Humanitarian intervention ?
2 In  his  study  Feeling  Global,  Bruce  Robbins  defines  the  discourse  of  human  rights  as
universalising  and  therefore  opposed  to  the  notions  of  culture  determined  by
differentiation which, he maintains, now dominate academic scholarship2. In this context,
in the academic circles at least, the human rights debate could prove liberating in its
potential ability to transcend the ever increasing production of real and imaginary Others
which  now  marks  the  culturalist  discourse.  In  practice,  however,  there  are  some
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troubling parallels between the “evangelical” humanitarianism of the late 1990s and the
enlightened forms of 19th-century imperialism. In his article entitled « Globocop ? Time to
Watch the Watchers »,  published in The  Nation in  1994 and cited in Feeling  Global,  C.
Douglas Lummiswrites : 
We can be confident that only the borders of middling and small  countries will
show a new legal permeability. These are the same countries whose borders were
always  permeable  throughout  the  age  of  colonialism  and  European  continental
imperialism : the countries of the Third World and Eastern Europe. However much
good might be achieved by, say, Norwegian or Nigerian peacekeepers protecting
human rights in Los Angeles or Detroit, it’s not something we are likely soon to see3
. 
3 However different the new humanitarian context might seem when compared to even the
most enlightened colonial aspirations, the division between the states which determine
the  need  for  an  intervention  and  have  the  means  of  conducting  it,  and  the  states
subjected to new human rights interventionism, remains relatively familiar. One might
compare  the  way  in  which  Paddy  Ashdown  was  considered  for  the  position  of
Commissioner for Kosovo with the role of his 19th century predecessor as British Liberal
Party leader, Gladstone, as the Commissioner for the Ionian Islands. The former French
health minister Bernard Kouchner, who was eventually appointed to the Kosovo post in
preference to Ashdown, is described as the « inventor of the concept of humanitarian
intervention » in his official curriculum vitæ4. He is acutely aware of the possibility of
being seen in an imperialist role in the Balkans and remains keen to avoid this : « we are
not in southern Sudan. We don’t have to teach people here how to vote »5. However, as in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, restrictions imposed on the local media and political organisations
have already attracted accusations of a colonialist mentality.
4 Many political commentators continue to examine both the positive and the negative
aspects of “human rights imperialism” in South-Eastern Europe. The time has come, it
seems, for the “white man to take up his burden” again. That he – and in very few cases,
she – is taking up his burden in the Balkans this time round is perhaps not surprising. In
an area populated by white peoples – a part of Europe (even if frequently described by the
British Prime Minister Tony Blair as being on the “European doorstep”) – this new form
of imperialism should in theory be free from any imputations of racism. In Europe, yet
obviously different from it, the Balkans provide a suitable context for an exercise in
apparently benevolent Western paternalism. The fact that a relatively enlightened and
prosperous Balkan federation, such as was once Yugoslavia, has in the course of that
exercise become a collection of small to middling states, several of which will remain for
the foreseeable future in dire need of foreign caretakers, is most usually ascribed to its
“Balkanness” rather than any form of external intervention. The troublesome and bloody
nature of Balkan nationalism has offered Britain – as it assumed the leading role amongst
the European participants in the military action against the Milošević regime – a timely
opportunity for developing a self-promoting and self-congratulatory stance at a time of
deep anxiety about its own position in Europe. 
5 I am troubled by the possibility that the “new humanitarianism” in the Balkans largely
appears to depend on the West’s self-attributed status of superior enlightenment, which
seems to me very similar to the position of the 19th century enlightened imperialism.
“Media-driven” government policy in Britain does open up an opportunity for a more
ethical  approach  to  foreign  policy.  Nonetheless,  it  also  contains  a  danger  that  the
Western  media,  and  in  particular  television,  with  its  self-confidence  based  on  its
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economic strength and its demand to be allowed freedom of movement and absolute
protection anywhere in the world, puts those whose foreign policy it guides in a position
equivalent to that of  the 19th-century “monarch of  all  I  survey”6.  Like the explorers,
adventurers  and  map  makers  who  preceded  the  colonial  armies  in  Africa  and  Asia,
journalists and cameramen announce the arrival of the new “humanitarian” troops. The
imperial eye is now watching through the lens of the camera.
 
Europe vs. Non-Europe
6 As far as the possible definitions of the Balkans are concerned, the attitudes of the 1990s
towards the peninsula seem to leave intact the old hierarchical structures in Europe,
whereby the north-west represents the most enlightened corner and therefore occupies
the self-conferred leadership role,  while the south-east plays out European fears and
taboos on the continent’s  edge.  Much as in late-Victorian gothic  novels,  the Balkans
continue to offer a site for the irrational and the obscene, European and yet yielding up
nightmares “unthinkable” in Europe. In practical terms, the only way to join Europe is to
escape from the Balkans. 
7 Instead  of  a  bi-partite,  Manichean  division  into  Eastern  and  Western  Europe  which
dominated the Cold War period,  our continent is now divided into “Europe” (i.e.  the
European  Union),  “Central  Europe”  (those  at  the  top  of  the  waiting  list  to  join  the
European Union), and those “beyond the pale” (i.e. much of the Balkans, Russia, Ukraine,
etc.). This division is symbolic and deeply hierarchical, and it has considerable practical
consequences on every aspect  of  cooperation between the West  and former “Eastern
Europe”,  from  the  definition  of  financial  aid  (“economic”  for  Central  Europe,
“humanitarian” for the Balkans), to visa regimes. The recent introduction of visas for
Croatian visitors to Britain was described in the Croatian press as a hostile attempt to
push Croatia back into the Balkans. One image that comes to mind is the location for one
of the last rounds of Kosovo peace talks in June 1999, an inn by the side of a Macedonian
road near Kumanovo, with Yugoslav and Nato army delegations,  in combat uniforms,
disappearing through the door above which the name, in the Cyrillic alphabet, spells out
“Europe 93, owner I. Sadiku”. Mr Sadiku probably named his locale after an international
football cup or some such event, little knowing that its image would one day be offered
five Warholian minutes of fame by the world news media. The symbolism was not lost on
Western  commentators  whose  references  to  Balkan  “aspirations”  to  European status
barely attempted to hide condescension. It was ridiculed as a typically “Balkan” image,
with the cunning and barbarous little countries trying to gain quick entry by the back
door into “our” Europe of peace and plenty.
8 A lot has already been said and written about the different ways in which the Balkans
confirm, or undermine,  the binary oppositions between the Occident and the Orient,
particularly in the context of the orientalist theories developed by Edward Said and his
successors over the past two decades. While the post-colonial debate struggled to undo
the Orient, many of its projections came to be redirected towards the Balkans (coinciding
with  the  post-1989  reappearance  of  the  area  from  under  the  withdrawing tide  of
Communism).  Allegedly  European,  the  Balkans  became  again  a  useful  repository  for
feelings of European superiority which could no longer be acted out elsewhere. Instead of
contrasting Europe with Africa and Asia and risking accusations of racism, we now often
define it as orderly, prosperous and enlightened in comparison with the Balkans. Trying
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to catch up with a Europe which is itself progressing, the Balkans always seem to remain
at the same distance away from it – always at the point of “beginning to be civilised”,
always about to join Europe, always in its backyard, or at best on its doorstep. 
9 How should the Balkan peoples react to this type of rhetoric ? So long as the hierarchical
distinctions  are  accepted,  their  reaction  as  neo-colonial  subjects  can  either  be
acquiescence  and  complicity,  or  a  kind  of  counter-attack.  Examples  of  both  these
strategies can easily be identified. A deferential attitude can be detected among those
Balkan politicians  who –  like  mission-educated Africans  or  Anglo-Indians  in  the  19th
century – accept the idea of the inferiority of the society which envelopes them, while
denying that they are part of it. « Yes, indeed, the Balkans are every bit as Balkan as you
say,  but  we here are  really  European.  If  you want  the  real  Balkans,  just  look at  the
Barbarians  next  door ».  The  media  (both  Western  and  “Balkan”)  frequently  tend  to
amplify this pattern by using the Balkan name very selectively, and rarely in any kind of
positive context. Meanwhile, anything positive that comes from the Balkans is attributed
to Central Europe. The Macedonian National Ballet, performing at the Riverside Theatre
in Hammersmith, London, last year,  was described in the programme as « one of the
leading Central European ballet companies ». A Polish speaker at the Central European
Festival held in London in the summer of 1998, talked about Central Europe as the area of
Europe which has the largest number of Nobel Prize winners per square kilometre and
then referred as his examples to writers such as the Bulgarian-born Elias Canetti, and two
novelists from the former Yugoslavia, Ivo Andrić and Danilo Kiš. (Although not a Nobel
winner, Kiš was presumably included on the grounds that he most certainly deserved the
prize.) Conversely, an unpleasant Central European “exception”, Hitler, has been blamed
upon the proximity of Vienna to the Balkans7.
10 Central  Europe now seems to  act  as  a  kind of  clearing house  for  those  about  to  be
admitted to the fully-fledged Western status. In the chapter entitled « Where is Central
Europe Now », in his new book History of the Present, Timothy Garton Ash writes about the
way in which the notion of Central Europe, used until not long ago as a cannon to fire
against Russia, is now largely directed against the Balkans8. For politicians everywhere,
and especially for Polish,  Hungarian and Czech politicians – Garton Ash writes – the
Manichean  contrast  between  “Central  Europe”,  bathed  in  light,  and  “the  Balkans”
drenched in blood, was irresistible. Central Europeans are seen as “civilised, democratic,
cooperative”, and therefore have a better chance of joining the EU. 
11 Complicity  in  accepting  an  opposition  between  Europe  and  the  Balkans,  frequently
involves – for Balkan countries – a desperate attempt to escape what is perceived as the
bloody grip of the peninsula. In an incisive article entitled “Flight from the Balkans”, the
Romanian Foreign Ministry official Elena Zamfirescu describes the way in which « the
obstinate perpetuation of old prejudices about that area’s destiny and destination, has
become one of the factors which encourage the flightfrom the Balkans », while at the
same time defining Romania as central-Central European9. « For both geographical and
geopolitical  reasons,  fully  substantiated  by  the  history  of  this century »,  Zamfirescu
argues, « the author shares the view that Romania and Hungary could be considered “the
centre” of Central Europe. Therefore the term Central-Southern Europe, coined by the
author  covers  the  Central-European  nations  situated  south  of  the  Danube »10.  While
explaining that the Romanians define their country as one which is “close to” and not
simply “bordering on” the Balkans, Zamfirescu sees Romania’s desire to be included in
the  Western  sphere  as  “a  natural  one” :  « Central  Europe  is  also  about  a  sense  of
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belonging and about political options. As a country whose institutional, political, cultural
and economic life has been, with the exclusion of the Cold War years, an intrinsic past of
the Western world, Romania’s desire to be included in Western institutions is a natural
one »11. Demonstrating a similar attempt to distance his country from the Balkans, at a
recent conference entitled NATO and Southeastern Europe : Security Issues for the Early 21st
Century, the Slovene speaker asserted : « there is a difference between Southeast Europe
and the Balkans. Slovenia is a country of Southeast Europe, but not a Balkan state »12. In
December  1996,  coinciding  with  the  moment  when  hundreds  of  thousands  of
demonstrators  in  Belgrade  were  promising  to  topple  Milošević,  a  German journalist
described Serbia as being in the Western Balkans, a first sign of its possible future move
into Central Europe. At the moment, it is obviously, and firmly, back in the East even
though it is to the West of Romania. In a similar vein, European Union officials now refer
to Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Albania and (only occasionally) Yugoslavia as
the Western Balkan countries13. Such taxonomic subterfuges, to borrow a phrase from
Elena Zamfirescu, might leave Bulgaria as the only – simultaneously Central and Eastern –
Balkan country, unless we accept the suggestion that it belongs to South-Central Europe,
thereby embracing the idea of the Balkans emptied of the Balkan states.
 
Conterassaults
12 The counterassault against such hierarchies comes in different guises. One is exemplified
by those who accept the bipolar opposition, but attempt instead to “talk up the other
side”. The Balkans are described as the cradle and the enduring guardian of European
civilisation, while Western Europeans are willingly joining the ranks of the lotus eaters in
the fold of American globalism. The Byzantine and Ottoman Empires have found new
apologists both in the Balkans and in the West, talking up the advantages of either the
Greek–speaking civic commonwealth or the Ottoman Millet system. 
13 While  “Europe”  (i.e.  the  EU)  is  itself  ambiguously  suspended between an attempt  to
promote and encourage new nation states in the Balkans and an effort to declare nation-
statism a  bankrupt  project,  there  is  no  shortage  of  proponents  of  every  side  of  the
argument. In Central Europe meanwhile, the nation states which are ethnically the most
homogenous (Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Czech Republic) are also the best off, as Garton
Ash points out, in the queue of applicants for membership in the (firmly multicultural)
European Union.
14 A different kind of couterassault against hierarchical oppositions between Europe and the
Balkans  now comes  from academia  – myself  included – with  a  wariness  of  the  new
essentialising traps that such a project might present. Here the Balkans are frequently
described as mulitply marginal. Always, seemingly, on the borderlines between externally
defined entities – Europe and Asia, East and West, this religion and that religion, the
Mediterranean and Continental Europe – the Balkans seem destined to remain in a kind of
deconstructionist  mise-en-abîme.  Jacques Derrida’s  concept of  différance[sic],  applied to
literature,  where  any  section  of  the  text,  however  minute,  always  reveals  internal
contradictions reflected in the whole, seems to be translated into symbolic geography.
There is no part of the Balkans which represents a stable identity, everything is defined
through difference. This might be profitable for academic investigations, but it is not easy
to see it as a springboard for constructing any kind of stability. The problem, it seems to
me, is that seeing the Balkans as permanently transitional in itself stigmatises the area. It
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implies  –  falsely  in my belief  –  that  other  areas  are monolithic  and not  transitional
themselves. (To put it crudely : Is this really a differentiaspecifica of the Balkans ? Couldn’t
we describe  the  British  isles  as  a  transitional  area  between America  and Europe,  or
Germany  as  a  transitional  area  between  Western  and  Central/or  Eastern  Europe ?)
Emphasising some uniquely Balkan marginality, we end up where we started. Wishing to
undo the privileging of Europeanness, we might fetishise the concept of “transitionality”,
which is perilously close to reaffirming the idea of culture as a kind of tectonic bloc. The
civilisations – however minutely we choose to define them – clash, Huntington style, and
the Balkan peninsula remains the earthquake zone.
15 I  have to conclude,  however,  that I  am not sure at  the moment just  how – short  of
resorting to neo-romanticist constructions – one might talk about the Balkans beyond the
culturalist debate which pitches the Self against the Others, seemingly reinforcing the
very identities it sets out to undo. On the other hand, and given the degree of cynicism
with which it has been exploited until now, the human rights discourse – although
potentially liberating – might well continue to be seen as useful in providing a set of
politically correct rhetorical devices. 
16 In  Európa  Köldöken ( The  Navel  of  Europe),  his  tellingly  titled  collection  of  essays,  the
Hungarian writer Gyorgy Konrád writes : 
One of my heads is Eastern, the other Western…We live on the Western edges of the
East and we are forced always to compare things and appearances. We are born
comparatists  … We cannot  reject  either  of  our  sides,  hence the paradox in  our
attitudes. Our specificity is contained in this. In effect, we are never at home. In our
permanent abode we are homesick for god knows where… At home, we always feel
a bit uneasy….14 
17
While this almost schizophrenic, pervasive anxiety of belonging is certainly not
unique to this corner of Europe, few areas seem express it so persistently. If we are ever
to  begin  to  feel  at  home  in  the  Balkans,  we  need  new  kinds  of  definitions  pretty
desperately.
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